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COMMENTS
HIDDEN-BUT-DISCOVERABLE DEFECTS:
RESOLVING THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN REAL
ESTATE BUYERS AND BROKERS
Kevin C. Culum*
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have had difficulty establishing the parameters of brokers'"
duty to disclose to buyers the physical defects of residential real property.
Often judicial analyses confuse this area of law by juxtaposing rigid and
outdated principles, such as caveat emptor, against contemporary policy
objectives, such as informing consumers. The confusion often results in
internally inconsistent decisions, thwarting the desired policy goals. This
comment proposes to discard current judicial analyses in favor of an anal-
ysis based on the reasonable expectations of both buyers and brokers.
The proposed analysis combines tort causes of action for broker misrepre-
sentations with a broker's duty to inspect property for hidden-but-discov-
erable defects.
* I would like to thank Zane K. Sullivan, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana, and
Professor Robert G. Natelson, School of Law, University of Montana, for their advice and
comments without which I could not have completed this comment. Any omissions or errors,
however, are strictly my own.
1. This comment uses the term "broker" to connote both real estate brokers and
agents. The Montana Code Annotated defines the term "broker" as follows:
"Broker" includes an individual who for another or for a fee, commission, or other
valuable consideration or who with the intent or expectation of receiving the same
negotiates or attempts to negotiate the listing, sale, purchase, rental, exchange, or
lease of real estate or of the improvements thereon or collects rents or attempts to
collect rents or advertises or holds himself out as engaged in any of the foregoing
activities. The term "broker" also includes an individual employed by or on behalf
of the owner or lessor of real estate to conduct the sale, leasing, subleasing, or
other disposition thereof at a salary or for a fee, commission, or any other consid-
eration. The term "broker" also includes an individual who engages in the busi-
ness of charging an advance fee or contracting for collection of a fee in connection
with a contract by which he undertakes primarily to promote the sale, lease, or
other disposition of real estate in this state through its listing in a publication
issued primarily for this purpose or for referral of information concerning real
estate to brokers, or both, and any person who aids, attempts, or offers to aid, for
a fee, any person in locating or obtaining any real estate for purchase or lease.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-102 (3) (1987). 1
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Consumerism has motivated reforms in this area of law. This com-
ment, therefore, focuses solely on residential real property and does not
address problems involved in detecting and disclosing defects in commer-
cial property. The comment begins by outlining policy objectives pursued
by courts today. This comment then traces the misrepresentation theories
which courts have used to encourage broker disclosure and the theories'
effectiveness in achieving those policy objectives. The comment then pro-
poses a judicial or legislative imposition of a broker's duty to inspect that
would succeed in aiding buyers without excessively increasing the burden
placed on brokers, and an analysis that courts should use when determin-
ing a broker's liability for failing to detect or disclose defects. Finally, the
comment concludes by outlining the logistical considerations Montana
must address before courts may effectively implement the proposed
analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development of Broker Liability
During the latter half of the nineteenth century with the federal gov-
ernment's freeing of large tracts of land from the public domain, the bro-
kerage business developed meteorically, and with it legal controversies.2
Unfortunately, the development of common-law responses to these con-
troversies did not keep pace with the growth of the brokerage business 2
Therefore, courts disposed of these controversies by using established le-
gal principles, particularly caveat emptor and agency theory.
4
Although these principles continue to pervade brokerage law,' they
fail to reflect market realities and society's view of the broker. Most peo-
ple contact a real estate broker as a matter of course when deciding to
purchase property, and most buyers believe the broker represents them in
a real estate transaction.6 Regrettably, brokers derive little incentive from
the market to perform obligations for the buyer's benefit such as provid-
ing material information. To fulfill buyers' and brokers' reasonable expec-
tations, Montana should adopt a legal framework founded in policy to
analyze broker torts.
2. D. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 1 (1982).
3. Id. at 2.
4. See, e.g., McLennan v. Inv. Exch. Co., 170 Mo. App. 389, 394, 156 S.W. 730, 732
(1913) (interpreting broker's duties by analogy to caveat emptor and agency principles);
Estes v. Crosby, 171 Wis. 73, 79, 175 N.W. 933, 935 (1920) (actions of agent gave rise to
broker liability).
5. See Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980) (broker has an absolute duty
of loyalty to the principal/seller).
6. Two-thirds of the buyers in a California study believed the broker represented
them in the transaction. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORTS, THE RESIDENTIAL
REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY 69 (Dec. 1983) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
332 [Vol. 50
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Developing a sound legal framework requires understanding the con-
flicting expectations of the buyer and the broker in a real estate transac-
tion. Given that buyers believe brokers represent them, buyers expect
that brokers will obtain and disclose all available material facts.7 Buyers
premise these expectations on brokers' presumed integrity and knowledge
of real estate.8 Buyers therefore rely on brokers to advise them on the
merits of the property's physical characteristics.9 Conversely, brokers are
chiefly concerned with realizing a profit and regard any imposition on
them of a legal obligation to buyers as a threat to their profit margin. A
realistic policy, though, can recognize broker obligations to buyers and
still minimize the costs resulting from the obligations. Brokers should not
expect to continue to enjoy their historical immunity from buyers' causes
of actions, but they do have a right to expect to know precisely what
conduct the law demands of them.'" Once brokers understand their legal
obligations to buyers, brokers can minimize their liability, and thereby
reduce their costs.
Several policy considerations compel the law to fulfill both parties'
expectations by imposing obligations to the buyer from the broker. First,
clarifying the broker's obligations to the buyer will not only fulfill the
broker's expectations, but will also increase the professionalism of the in-
dustry. Imposing consistent professional standards will help eliminate
brokers from the industry who now profit from the law's current vague-
ness by satisfying the law's bare minimum. Second, by granting the bro-
ker a license, a state essentially grants the broker a profitable franchise.
States therefore have a duty to "regulate [the broker] and, thus, protect
the public against abuses which can occur within the real estate busi-
ness."" Third, of the two parties, the broker is better able to obtain ma-
terial information concerning the property. Thus, equity demands placing
this responsibility on the broker.' 2 Fourth, because the placing of this re-
sponsibility on brokers would increase buyers' available information, it
7. Regardless of issues of contractual privity and agency, courts recognize that bro-
kers owe certain duties to buyers. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 177,
180 Cal. Rptr. 95, 107 (1982); Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, -, 29 Cal. Rptr.
201, 206 (1963).
8. Ninety-five percent of buyers rely on brokers to some degree, specifically because
of brokers' "knowledge of the housing market." NATIONAL FAMILY OPINION, INC., BUYER
QUESTIONNAIRE 16 (Dec. 1979 to Jan. 1980) [hereinafter QUESTIONNAIRE], reprinted in FTC
REPORT, supra note 6.
9. As one survey showed, over two-thirds of buyers relied on the broker to some de-
gree "to discover structural defects." QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 8, at 17.
10. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS 17 (1987).
11. Amato v. Rathbun Realty, Inc., 98 N.M. 231, 232, 647 P.2d 433, 434 (1982).
12. See Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 615 P.2d 1305 (1980). In this often
cited case, the court stated that the policy behind identifying a duty from a broker to a
buyer is that the broker "is a professional who is in a unique position to verify critical
information given him ...." Id. at 706, 615 P.2d at 1309.
1989]
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would necessarily raise the level of the real estate market's efficiency."3
Finally, because brokers derive profit from real estate transactions, it is
only just that the brokerage industry internalize and bear the cost when
brokers fail to meet their professional standard. 4
For the preceding policy reasons, courts and legislatures should de-
mand that brokers disclose to buyers !'facts materially affecting the value
or desirability of the property that are known to [them] or which through
reasonable diligence should be known to [them]."'" Policy compels, there-
fore, two separate broker obligations; first, the duty to disclose to the
buyer all available information, and second, the affirmative duty to obtain
information for the buyer. Currently, a majority of jurisdictions concen-
trate solely on the first, and base their analyses on misrepresentation
torts.'6 A limited number of jurisdictions, however, do extend the broker's
obligations to the buyer to the affirmative duty to obtain information.17
C. The State of the Law in Montana
Montana belongs to the majority of jurisdictions which recognize
misrepresentation torts in a buyer-broker transaction. In McCarty v. Lin-
coln Green, Inc.,' s the Montana Supreme Court adopted negligent mis-
representation as a cause of action for a buyer against a broker. 9 In Mc-
Carty, the buyer relied on the broker's inaccurate representations
concerning the property's acreage. 20 Since McCarty, the Montana Su-
preme Court has not again addressed broker liability for a negligent mis-
representation.2 ' However, in the recent case of Wagner v. Cutler, 2 2 the
court imposed liability on a seller for negligently misrepresenting the con-
13. Note, Imposing Tort Liability on Real Estate Brokers Selling Defective Housing,
99 HARV. L. REv. 1861, 1867 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Gauerke v. Rozga, 112 Wis. 2d 271, 280, 332 N.W.2d 804, 809 (1983).
Enterprise liability thus applies to the brokerage profession.
15. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1984).
16. See Murray, The Real Estate Broker & the Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to
Investigate, 32 VILL. L. REV. 939, 964-79 (1987).
17. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See generally Amato, 98
N.M. at 233, 647 P.2d at 435 (broker must have general knowledge of building code and use
it to obtain information for the buyer); Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1982)
(broker can fulfill duty by investigating seller's statements); Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d
465, 479 (Iowa 1985) (Wolle, J., dissenting).
18. - Mont. -, 620 P.2d 1221 (1980).
19. In McCarty, the court distinguished Schulz v. Peake, 178 Mont. 261, 583 P.2d 425
(1978) which rejected negligent misrepresentation because, unlike Schulz, the buyer in Mc-
Carty did not inspect the actual property, and therefore had no opportunity to discover the
defect. McCarty, - Mont. at -, 620 P.2d at 1224.
20. Id. at -, 620 P.2d at 1224.
21. Because Montana courts liken MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED § 28-2-406 (1987) (codi-
fying constructive fraud) to negligent misrepresentation, buyers may also seek damages
against a broker for constructive fraud. See 1988 ANNOTATION to MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-
406 for cases.
22. - Mont. -, 757 P.2d 779 (1988). 4
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dition of a home.2 The Montana Supreme Court has not expressly
adopted innocent misrepresentation torts in buyer-broker transactions.2 4
Finally, neither the Montana Supreme Court nor the Montana legislature
has required the broker to augment a buyer's information. 6
III. BUYERS' THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Courts and legislatures now attempt to satisfy the objective of full
and truthful disclosure of brokers' statements through misrepresentation
torts. These theories reflect traditional tort causes of action, and include
intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and innocent
misrepresentation. Silhouetting misrepresentation theories against a
backdrop of the buyers' and brokers' expectations illustrates the failure
of these theories to encompass the practical needs of buyers and brokers.
A. Intentional Misrepresentation
Intentional misrepresentation torts historically provided buyers their
first theory of recovery against brokers for brokers' affirmative misrepre-
sentations designed to induce buyers to purchase residential real prop-
erty.26 Brokers commit fraud when they fail to disclose material facts
2 7 of
which they have actual knowledge and on which the buyer justifiably re-
lied.2" Eventually, courts recognized that intentional omissions may con-
stitute fraud when the broker "is under a legal duty to speak."2 9
23. Id. at __, 757 P.2d at 783.
24. But see Parkhill v. Fuselier, - Mont. -, 632 P.2d 1132 (1981). In Parkhill, the
plaintiffs/buyers alleged innocent misrepresentation. In affirming the trial court's holding,
the Montana Supreme Court focused on the negligence of the agents of the defendants/
sellers, and therefore left the issue of innocent misrepresentation unresolved. Id. at -, 632
P.2d at 1135.
25. But see Evans v. Teakettle Realty, - Mont. -, 736 P.2d 472 (1987). In Evans,
the trial court offered a duty to inspect instruction. However, neither party appealed the
instruction which read as follows:
The duty of a real estate agent, representing the seller, to disclose facts, includes
the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of
the residential property listed for sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all
facts materially [affecting the] value or desirability of the property that such an
investigation would reveal.
Id. at -, 736 P.2d at 475 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
26. See Estes, 171 Wis. at 80, 175 N.W. at 935-36. In the early twentieth century,
several buyers successfully sued brokers for their fraudulent statements about the actual
purchase price. See, e.g., Hokanson v. Oatman, 165 Mich. 512, 517, 131 N.W. 111, 113 (1911)
(buyer entitled to rely on broker representations). In time, courts applied fraud theory to
misrepresentations concerning physical defects in housing. See, e.g., Wolford v. Freeman,
150 Neb. 537, 544, 35 N.W.2d 98, 102 (1948) (broker stated that cracks in walls and founda-
tion resulted from simple "settling").
27. Courts define a material fact as "one to which a reasonable person would attach
importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question." See, e.g.,
Lynn v. Taylor, 7 Kan. 2d 369, -, 642 P.2d 131, 134-35 (1982).
28. Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at -, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
29. Lynn, 7 Kan. 2d at -, 642 P.2d at 134 (broker failed to disclose to buyer the 5
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B. Negligent Misrepresentation
After prohibiting brokers from committing an intentional misrepre-
sentation, courts broadened the scope of the broker's duty to provide the
buyer with information by adopting negligent misrepresentation theory.3 0
Negligent misrepresentation imposes on brokers a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care in "obtaining and communicating information which the
[buyer] is justified in expecting. .. ."' Beyond conveying such material
information, the broker need not answer further questions propounded by
the buyer.3 2 Although owing no duty to answer these questions, brokers
may choose to offer an answer to the question. When they do, brokers
assume a duty to respond accurately, and a misrepresentation will give
rise to negligent misrepresentation liability.3 3 Negligent misrepresentation
provides an incentive for brokers to be honest when inducing buyers to
purchase property.
Should the Montana Supreme Court consider expanding the negli-
gent misrepresentation tort, it should examine the dramatic range in ap-
plication of the tort from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 3 For example, some
courts require the buyer to demonstrate the broker's actual knowledge of
the defect, blurring the distinction between fraud and negligent misrepre-
sentation. 35 Conversely, certain jurisdictions exact a high duty of care
results of an adverse termite report).
30. The Amato court quoted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977) as
follows:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuni-
ary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
Amato, 98 N.M. at 232, 647 P.2d at 434 (emphasis added by court).
Montana adopted the tort of negligent misrepresentation as a cause of action for buyers
against brokers in McCarty, - Mont. at -, 620 P.2d at 1224. For a more detailed discus-
sion, see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
31. Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 148, 548 P.2d 107, 110 (1976).
32. Courts have criticized the actual knowledge standard for negligent misrepresenta-
tion because it discourages the broker from offering to the buyer information not specifically
requested. As one court stated, "If a broker were required to disclose only known defects ...
he would be shielded by his ignorance of that which he holds himself out to know." Easton,
152 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. Another critic noted that negligent misrepre-
sentation theory allows "brokers to misrepresent material aspects of the property in ques-
tion with impunity unless the buyer" can show actual or constructive knowledge. Hoffman
v. Connall, 108 Wash. 2d 69, 82, 736 P.2d 242, 248 (1987) (Dore, J., dissenting).
33. Fennell Realty Co. v. Martin, 529 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Ala. 1988) (exception to Ala-
bama's general rule of caveat emptor).
34. The Wagner decision indicates Montana may lean toward a broader interpretation
of negligent misrepresentation when faced with the issue again. Wagner, - Mont. __, 757
P.2d 779.
35. See Hammond v. Matthes, 109 Mich. App. 352, 311 N.W.2d 357 (1981). The Ham-
mond court held that "the [buyer] must show the additional element that the agent made
the questionable representation knowing it to be false or made it recklessly without knowl- 6
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that actually imputes knowledge to brokers.3 ' These examples demon-
strate the broad spectrum of applications from which Montana may de-
velop further the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
C. Innocent Misrepresentation
3 7
Some jurisdictions impose liability on brokers for innocently convey-
ing false information which materially affects the buyer's decision to
purchase the residential real property. 8 In these cases, brokers innocently
passed on to buyers the false representations the sellers had made to the
brokers.3 Courts apply this tort by focusing on two aspects of the buyer-
broker transaction. First, courts hold brokers liable for the misrepresenta-
tion because they implied personal knowledge of the statements' verac-
ity.' ° This pretense of knowledge effectively replaces the knowing or neg-
ligence element of the other misrepresentation analyses. Second, courts
justify holding brokers liable for these innocent misrepresentations by
choosing between the two equally innocent parties, buyer and broker."'
edge of its truth .... " Id. at 359, 311 N.W.2d at 361. See also Provost v. Miller, 144 Vt. 67,
473 A.2d 1162 (1984). In Provost, the court relieved the broker from liability by stating, "An
agent is not liable because of misrepresentations of the principal or of another agent unless
[the broker] knows or should know of them." Id. at 69, 473 A.2d at 1163 (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 comment b (1958)) (emphasis supplied).
36. Amato, 98 N.M. at 233, 647 P.2d at 434 (broker is assumed to know the building
code).
37. For an excellent discussion of innocent misrepresentation, see Note, Realtor Lia-
bility for Innocent Misrepresentation and Undiscovered Defects: Balancing the Equities
Between Broker and Buyer, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 255 (1986) (authored by Linda S. Whitton).
38. In Bevins, the court quoted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) as
follows:
One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, makes a misrepre-
sentation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or to
refrain from acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other for pecu-
niary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation,
even though it is not made fraudulently or negligently.
Bevins, 655 P.2d at 762.
In Wisconsin, the courts recognize an action for buyers against brokers in strict respon-
sibility for misrepresentation. This tort resembles the more common tort of innocent mis-
representation, and its elements are as follows:
(1) that the [broker] made a representation of fact; (2) that such representation
of fact was untrue; (3) that the [broker] made the representation as a fact based
on his own personal knowledge, or in circumstances in which he necessarily ought
to have known the truth or untruth of the statement; (4) that the [broker] had an
economic interest in the transaction; and (5) that the [buyer] believed such repre-
sentation to be true and relied on it.
Reda v. Sincaban, 145 Wis. 2d 266, __, 426 N.W.2d 100, 102 (1988) (emphasis supplied).
39. Bevins, 655 P.2d at 763.
40. Id. at 762.
41. Id. at 763. See also Gauerke, 112 Wis. 2d at 282, 332 N.W.2d at 809. The Gauerke
court stated, "Public opinion calls for placing the loss on the innocent [broker] rather than
on the innocent [buyer]" when the broker has an "economic interest in the transaction"
from which the broker expects to gain. Id. 7
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This second aspect connotes a strict liability standard.4 2 Courts, however,
have not yet focused solely on strict liability when imposing liability on
brokers for innocent misrepresentation, explaining that brokers had the
alternative of "disclaiming" knowledge rather than making a
misrepresentation .
4
If Montana courts extend the tort of innocent misrepresentation to
broker statements, Montana must adopt both prongs of the analysis. Bus-
iness decisions of brokers often hinge on the risk of exposure to liability,
the cost of verifying information, and the potential for increased sales
based on information inducing buyers to buy the property. Extension of
the scope of brokers' liability to strict liability may actually reduce the
amount of information available to buyers. Under strict liability, the risk
of exposure may outweigh the other two factors, motivating brokers to
"disclaim" any knowledge about the property and to refrain from making
any representation concerning it.
Even though jurisdictions applying innocent misrepresentation con-
tinue to focus on both prongs of the analysis, including the brokers' pre-
tense of knowledge, courts nonetheless fail to encourage brokers to pro-
vide buyers with available and accurate information. Courts offer brokers
two alternatives to avoid liability, disclaiming knowledge or "investigat-
ing" sellers' statements.44 The first alternative in such jurisdictions, bro-
kers disclaiming knowledge, certainly does not fulfill the objective of in-
creasing the buyer's information." These courts enumerate only one
other alternative for brokers, to "investigate" sellers' representations or
to require sellers to "certify" their statements.46 However, this alternative
amounts to no more than obtaining a warranty from the seller.
D. Misrepresentation Theory Analysis
Misrepresentation torts standing alone do not satisfy the objective of
increasing buyers' available information because misrepresentation theo-
ries do not demand from brokers the affirmative duty to acquire accurate
information for the buyer. 7 Arguably, innocent misrepresentation theory
may encourage brokers to "investigate" sellers' statements, but it does
not compel such an investigation. 8 Because misrepresentation theories
promote veracity in broker representations, however, a comprehensive
analysis of broker-buyer transactions in Montana must necessarily in-
clude intentional and negligent misrepresentation tort causes of action.
42. Hoffman, 108 Wash. 2d at 73-74, 736 P.2d at 244 (rejecting innocent misrepresen-
tation); Bevins, 655 P.2d at 764 (Connor, J., dissenting).
43. Bevins, 655 P.2d at 763.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Arguably, this investigation could conflict with brokers' absolute duty of loy-
alty to a seller/principal. See Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1248 (Utah).
47. Each theory bases liability solely on a material misrepresentation, rather than on
breaching a duty to acquire information.
48. See, e.g., Bevins, 655 P.2d at 763.
[Vol. 50
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IV. DUTY TO INSPECT
A. The Judicial Version
In the landmark decision of Easton v. Strassburger,49 a California
appellate court extended a broker's duties to include inspecting property
for defects that the broker should discover through "reasonable dili-
gence." 50 The Easton court stated that certain soil problems on the prop-
erty should have alerted the broker that he needed to inspect the prop-
erty for hidden defects. Because the broker failed to detect and disclose
these soil problems, the court imposed liability on the broker." The Eas-
ton court defined the soil problems as hidden from the buyer, but discov-
erable by the broker, thus defining an essentially hidden-but-discoverable
defect.
Both buyers and brokers, the Easton court presupposed, have a duty
to inspect the property involved in a transaction.2 The buyer, however,
lacks the expertise to detect and discover hidden-but-discoverable de-
fects. 3 The broker, who has "superior knowledge, skills and experience,"
on the other hand, should be able to detect and discover such defects.5"
Although the Easton court established for brokers the duty to make a
"reasonably competent and diligent inspection," '55 the court exempted
brokers from disclosing "manifest" defects. 6 The court reasoned that if a
buyer fails to detect these "manifest defects" upon an inspection of the
property, then the buyer's own failure would be the sole "proximate cause
of any injury [the buyer] suffered. '57 The Easton court could have com-
pleted a sound analysis by expressly stating that because brokers are una-
ble to detect latent defects, brokers should not bear the risk of liability
for those defects.
B. Legislative Solutions
Recently the California legislature codified the Easton rule by requir-
49. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984). For an excellent discussion of the
ramifications of Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, see Note,
Broker Liability After Easton v. Strassburger: Let the Buyer Be Aware, 25 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 651 (1985) (authored by Joel M. King).
50. Easton 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
51. Id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. In Easton, "massive earth movement" and
"[slubsequent slides" significantly damaged the foundation of the home and led to cracked
walls and warping of doorways. Id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Expert testimony suggested
that the land upon which the house rested was actually "fill" which had been improperly
"engineered and compacted." Id. Moreover, slides had occurred during the previous owner's
period of ownership, but the owner failed to disclose the slides to the broker. Id. at 96, 199
Cal. Rptr. at 386.
52. Id. (alluding to a buyer's inspection).
53. Id. at 105, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr at 388.
56. Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
57. Id. 9
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ing all brokers to inspect residential real property, and answered many of
the unresolved questions of the Easton v. Strassburger decision. 8 The
legislature, therefore, provided specific precepts founded on policy which
the common law had lacked in buyer-broker disclosure controversies. 9
The California statute limits the broker's duty to a visual inspection of
the property, 0 and the inspection includes only those "areas that are rea-
sonably and normally" accessible "to such an inspection."'" For example,
a broker's duty includes inspecting the walls, floors, and roof, but does
not include an inspection of the water main. Further, California's statute
incorporates a "reasonably prudent" real estate broker standard, requir-
ing brokers to use the knowledge obtained through "education, experi-
ence, and examination" when inspecting property.2 By defining the duty,
the legislature not only put brokers on notice of their obligation to buy-
ers, but also specified the obligation. In return for this exacting obliga-
tion, the legislature acknowledged brokers' professional status, a recogni-
tion inherent in the Easton decision.
Although California's statute furthers the availability of information
to buyers, it also permits confusion by interchanging the words "investi-
gate" and "inspect."6 3 By equating the words, the statute arguably broad-
ens the scope of the duty to inspect from assuring that buyers benefit
from brokers' special expertise to acts such as investigating the public
record. Legislation compelling a broker to inspect property should limit
its scope to a visual inspection of the property itself, and should not in-
clude in the duty to inspect those acts which exceed the broker's unique
ability to benefit a buyer." Brokers do not solely possess the knowledge
58. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079-2079.5 (West Supp. 1989). CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE Section
2079 (West Supp. 1989) provides:
It is the duty of a real estate broker ... to a prospective purchaser of residential
real property comprising one to four dwelling units . . . to conduct a reasonably
competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to
disclose to that prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of the property that such an investigation would reveal, if that broker
has a written contract with the seller to find or obtain a buyer or is a broker who
acts in cooperation with such a broker to find and obtain a buyer.
(Emphasis supplied).
The California legislature expressly intended to codify Easton v. Strassburger and to
"resolve and make precise" the scope of the duty to inspect. 1985 CAL. STAT. 223 § 4.
59. In Smith v. Rickard, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1354, 254 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1988), for example,
the court relied on legislative intent to conclude that the statute does not require a broker
representing a party to a commercial transaction to perform an inspection. Id. at -, 254
Cal. Rptr. at 636. Smith relied on the statement in Easton expressing "no opinion [on]
whether a broker's obligation to conduct an inspection for defects for benefit of the buyer
applies to the sale of commercial real estate" as the intent of the legislature which codified
Easton. Id. (quoting Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 n.8).
60. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079 (West Supp. 1989).
61. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.3 (West Supp. 1989).
62. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2079.2 (West Supp. 1989).
63. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2079 (West Supp. 1989).
64. See Gauerke, 112 Wis. 2d at 281, 332 N.W.2d at 806 (liability for misrepresenta-
tion of property's acreage); Hoffman, 108 Wash. 2d at 70-71, 736 P.2d at 242-43 (broker not
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to detect defects in the public record or to project the property's commer-
cial capability. Rather, professions such as title insurers, surveyors, and
economists offer buyers the requisite expertise in these areas."5 Moreover,
buyers must assume certain of the economic risks involved in the
purchase of property because they receive the benefit of any economic
boon that may occur.
If Montana chooses to enact a statutory duty to inspect, the Mon-
tana legislature should restrict broker liability solely to hidden-but-dis-
coverable defects. 6 Moreover, Montana courts should limit brokers' lia-
bility to defects patent upon a broker's expert inspection and preserve
the hidden-but-discoverable distinction." Historically, common law had
defined patent defects as "apparent" or "obvious" upon a visual inspec-
tion,"' and latent defects as "not visible" upon a visual inspection. 9 Be-
cause latent defects by definition cannot be detected even by the brokers'
expert eyes, such defects are not hidden-but-discoverable defects, and
should exceed the scope of the duty to inspect.
70
V. A PROPOSED BROKER DUTY TO INSPECT FOR MONTANA
Satisfying both the buyer's expectation of more accurate information
about residential real property and the broker's expectation of a defined
course of conduct warrants that Montana be the first state to follow Cali-
fornia's lead and expressly adopt, judicially or legislatively, a broker's
liable for discrepancy in the property's boundary).
65. See, e.g., Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 202 Mont. 1, 8-10, 655 P.2d 970, 973-74 (1983)
(title insurer had duty to disclose easement arising from wild deed mentioned in chain of
title).
66. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of a
hidden-but-discoverable defect.
67. The California statute explicitly states, for example, that:
Nothing in this article relieves a buyer or prospective buyer of the duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect himself or herself, including those facts which are
known to or within the diligent attention and observation of the buyer or prospec-
tive buyer.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.5 (West Supp. 1989).
68. A patent defect is defined as: "In sales of personal property, one which is plainly
visible or which can be discovered by such an inspection as would be made in the exercise of
ordinary care and prudence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1013 (5th ed. 1979).
69. A latent defect is defined as: "One which could not be discovered by reasonable
and customary inspection; one not apparent on face of goods, product, document, etc."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (5th ed. 1979).
70. By refusing to impose liability on the broker for such latent defects, Montana can
adhere to the sound analysis first described in Easton. Several courts impose liability on
brokers for latent defects because these courts fail to analyze what kinds of defects brokers
should detect. Further, courts should analyze what defects buyers should detect. This analy-
sis would explain how certain defects can be apparent or patent to brokers, and yet be
latent or not visible to buyers. See Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 138 Ill. App. 3d 172, 182,
485 N.E.2d 855, 864, (1985) (describing the defect as a latent defect which the broker had an
obligation to detect and disclose); Ernestine v. Baker, 515 So.2d 826, 827-28 (La. 1987) (im-
posing liability on broker for a latent defect which the broker had discovered). 11
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duty to inspect the property he or she sells. 7' Coupling a duty to inspect
with the already adopted misrepresentation torts will provide Montana
the two legs of analysis necessary to resolve the conflict between brokers'
and buyers' expectations in a real estate transaction. Montana's duty to
inspect, moreover, must conform to brokers' professional standards and
must specify visual inspections of the property.
A. Brokers' Professional Standards
When courts speak of "broker expertise," they acknowledge that bro-
kers have risen to an advantageous position in the real estate market.
Unlike buyers, brokers are involved in countless real estate transactions a
year, and therefore conduct numerous inspections of property every year.
Buyers rely on brokers precisely because of this experience and training.
Buyers perceive that the licensing requirements of brokers and their con-
stant involvement with residential real property must breed in them "ex-
pertise." Indeed, it is this expertise which buyers solicit when contacting
a real estate broker.
Brokers also view their unique professional standards as the source of
society's need for them. When an occupation finally attains the stature of
a profession, the profession regulates itself by reprimanding individuals
who fail to satisfy the professional standard of care, by submitting to gov-
ernmental licensing requirements, and by expanding the professional
knowledge within the profession.7" Imposing a duty to inspect will appro-
priately encourage these elements of professionalism which buyers and
brokers themselves already recognize.
Proving a breach of the duty to inspect will necessitate proof of the
breach of brokers' professional standards. The Easton decision and the
California statute, for example, both state that a broker's inspection must
be "reasonably competent and diligent," connoting a flexible standard of
professional competence and expertise. 73 Self-regulation, moreover, as-
71. Several courts have expressly rejected the duty to inspect. See Munjal, 138 Ill.
App. 3d at 182, 485 N.E.2d at 864; Dawson v. Tindell, 733 P.2d 407, 408 (Okla. 1987); Pa-
cific Northwest Life Ins. Co. v. Turnbull, 51 Wash. App. 692, 697, 754 P.2d 1262, 1266
(1988).
Certain jurisdictions, however, imply brokers must inspect the property to avoid liabil-
ity. See Amato, 98 N.M. at 233, 647 P.2d at 435 (broker must have general knowledge of
building code and use it to obtain information for the buyer). See also, Menzel, 362 N.W.2d
at 479 (Iowa) (Wolle, J. dissenting).
72. In Menzel the court quoted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A as
follows:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who under-
takes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exer-
cise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or
trade in good standing in similar communities.
Menzel, 362 N.W.2d at 471 (Iowa).
The Menzel court also elaborated extensively on the merits of brokers' professional stan-
dard. Id.
73. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079 (West Supp. 1989); Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal.
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sumes that only fellow professionals can recognize a colleague's failure to
meet the professional standard. Therefore, buyers who seek damages
from brokers for breach of the duty to inspect will require expert testi-
mony from other brokers to satisfy their burden of proof. Such expert
testimony would show whether, given applicable professional standards,
the broker should have detected the complained-of defect in the inspec-
tion. The stringency of brokers' professional duty will depend mainly on
brokers themselves, but the Montana courts and legislature can demand
as a minimum the duty to inspect the property visually. To fulfill this
duty, brokers should inspect those "areas reasonably and normally" ac-
cessible upon inspection,74 and detect and disclose hidden-but-discovera-
ble defects in a report filed with the listing agreement. 75 Because the
scope of the duty to inspect extends only to detecting and disclosing hid-
den-but-discoverable defects, it relieves brokers of the obligation to de-
tect latent defects and to disclose "manifest defects."
When imposing the duty to inspect, Montana should consider the ar-
ray of professional standards developed in other jurisdictions. Such stan-
dards mandate, for example, that odors or noises give rise to a further
duty of inquiry.76 Montana could certainly require brokers to inspect resi-
dential real property with "a general knowledge of the building code.
'77 If
brokers have a working knowledge of the building code, they will more
likely recognize violations suggesting a hidden-but-discoverable defect. In
evaluating additional standards, the Montana courts and legislature
should also examine the current licensing requirements for brokers for
adequacy, particularly the education and experience requirements.
78
Moreover, any statutory adoption of broker standards should be suffi-
ciently flexible to permit the judiciary to recognize advances made in the
profession and to fashion the duty accordingly.
B. Definitions
Consistent imposition of the duty to inspect will require distinguish-
ing between manifest, hidden-but-discoverable, and latent defects. De-
fects which buyers should recognize upon a visual inspection are manifest
defects;7 9 defects which brokers should recognize upon visual inspection
are hidden-but-discoverable, s and those defects which neither broker nor
Rptr. at 388.
74. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.3 (West Supp. 1989).
75. See infra Section VI for a discussion of the inspection report.
76. Ernestine, 515 So.2d at 826-27 (La.) (broker liable for odors emitted from property
after receiving notice from a prospective purchaser).
77. Amato, 98 N.M. at 233, 647 P.2d at 435. In practice, this requirement may exceed
the California standard because building defects may not normally be visible upon
inspection.
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-302 (a)-(c) (1987). See infra Section VI. C. for a discus-
sion of Montana licensing requirements.
79. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
80. Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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buyer can recognize upon a visual inspection are latent.
1. Manifest Defects
In Easton v. Strassburger, the court noted that certain defects are
"apparent" or "manifest" on a buyer's inspection, relieving the broker
from liability for failure to disclose such defects.8 ' Unfortunately, the
Easton court did not elaborate on these manifest defects. Recently,
though, the Montana Supreme Court provided guidance in Wagner v.
Cutler. In that case, the court listed several "noticeable defects" the
buyer should have detected when inspecting the property. Because the
buyer failed to detect these defects, the buyer had no recourse against the
broker for those defects."' Such defects included an "unfinished base-
ment, unfinished steps leading to the basement, light fixtures which were
not in their sockets, cracks in the patio pavement, and incomplete heating
ducts. '83 In Wagner, the Montana Supreme Court sent a clear message to
buyers to inspect residential real property for "obvious" flaws that all
people, regardless of expertise, must recognize as a defect. 4
2. Hidden-But-Discoverable Defects
Because brokers have professional expertise in inspecting residential
real property, brokers can detect upon their inspection defects which
buyers cannot. These hidden-but-discoverable defects fall into three basic
categories: (1) foundation problems, including termite damage and warp-
ing and cracking of floors;" (2) general structural problems, including
warped doorways, out of plumb walls, and possible asbestos contamina-
tion; 6 and (3) indications of major problems including leaking pipes sug-
gesting plumbing problems, wall damage or roof damage indicating flood
problems, apparent soil problems such as those in Easton v. Strassburger,
and any detectable problems with water or heating capacity.8 7
81. Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
82. Wagner, . Mont. at __, 757 P.2d at 783.
83. Id. at -, 757 P.2d at 781.
84. Id. at -, 757 P.2d at 783.
85. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (cracked walls and
warped doorways); Godfrey 128 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 100 (termite damage
and dry rot); Prichard v. Reitz, 178 Cal. App. 3d 465, 467, 223 Cal. Rptr. 734, 735 (founda-
tion problems); Lynn, 7 Kan. 2d at _; 642 P.2d at 134 (termite damage).
86. See Bevins, 655 P.2d at 759 (Alaska) (insufficient well water); Menzel, 362 N.W.2d
at 468 (Iowa) (walls "out of plumb," improper floor support and ventilation, and obvious
violations of building codes); Cory v. Carona, 527 So.2d 495, 496 (La. 1988) (noticeable crack
in bathroom floor did not indicate crack in the foundation); Amato, 98 N.M. at 232, 647
P.2d at 434 (property condemned); Dawson, 733 P.2d at 409 (Okla.) (cracks in the driveway,
and a separation between the frame of the garage door and the bricks); Pacific Northwest,
51 Wash. App. at 696, 754 P.2d at 1265 (landfill prevented commercial development).
87. See Blackmon v. First Real Estate Corp., 529 So.2d 955, 956 (Ala. 1988) (sewage
problems); Fennell Realty, 529 So.2d at 1004 (Ala.) (heating and air conditioning system);
Ernestine, 515 So.2d at 827 (La.) (leaking roof); Munjal, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 174, 485 N.E.2d
at 858 (flooding problems); Neff, 89 N.M. at 147, 548 P.2d at 109 (heating and cooling sys-
14




Finally, some defects remain undetectable or "latent" regardless of
who inspects the property. To encourage detection of hidden-but-discov-
erable defects,8 8 courts and legislatures must exclude these latent defects
from the brokers' duty to inspect and disclose. Brokers should not bear
liability for latent defects. Latent defects may include sewer or water
pipes breaking without warning, a furnace exploding without previously
exhibiting a noticeable defect, or toxic seepage imperceptible during the
broker's inspection. Regardless of how the law treats these physical types
of defects, the law should not demand from brokers the duty to inspect
the public record for "defects" such as inaccurate acreage figures.
C. Proposed Analysis
Legislative or judicial adoption of the broker's duty to inspect re-
quires a new, three-step analysis of broker liability. The analysis focuses
first on the buyer's responsibility to inspect the residential real property,
then on the broker's duty to inspect, and finally on any alleged broker
misrepresentations. Examining the buyer's responsibility to inspect the
property and the buyer's conduct while performing the inspection should
reveal if the alleged defect was manifest. If so, the analysis proceeds di-
rectly to the third step of the analysis, possible broker misrepresenta-
tions. However, if the defect was not manifest, then a court should turn
to the second step, an analysis of the broker's inspection. In this step, a
court should first review the broker's inspection report, which would
clearly demonstrate whether the broker's inspection revealed the defect.
In addition, the report would supply a summary of the procedures the
broker used to detect defects. This step is crucial because it would en-
courage uniformity in broker conduct. Finally, after analyzing the buyer's
and broker's inspections, a court should focus on any intentional or negli-
gent misrepresentations that the broker may have made. Three examples
of possible holdings demonstrate how a court could use this analysis to
impose liability with appropriate regard for the policy considerations un-
derlying the categories of defects.
1. Manifest Defects
If the basement is unfinished yet the buyer still chooses to purchase
the home, then the buyer should have no recourse against the broker for
negligently inspecting the property. However, if the broker or an agent
makes any intentional or negligent misrepresentation concerning the
property or the defect, the buyer should have an opportunity to recover
damages under the third-step of the analysis for the misrepresentations
which influenced the buyer's decision to purchase the property.
tem defects).
88. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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2. Hidden-But-Discoverable Defects
If the broker's inspection report demonstrates that the broker discov-
ered, for example, a foundation problem, then the court cannot impose
liability on the broker for breaching the duty to inspect. However, the
court must pursue the analysis, nonetheless, by turning to misrepresenta-
tion theories of recovery. The analysis should focus on whether the broker
disclosed the foundation problem to the buyer. If the broker failed to dis-
close fully the foundation problem to the buyer, then the court should
hold the broker liable for the defect under an intentional or negligent
misrepresentation theory. If the broker, however, did disclose fully the
discovered defect to the buyer, the court should address other alleged
misrepresentations involving, for example, the extent of the defect. In the
absence of such other allegations, the broker is free of liability for the
defect. 9
If, on the other hand, the broker fails to demonstrate the discovery of
the foundation problem, the broker may have breached the duty to in-
spect. The court should therefore review the broker's inspection proce-
dures against the professional standards of care to determine if the bro-
ker breached these standards when inspecting the property. If so, the
court should impose liability on the broker for breaching the inspection
duty." The court's analysis should also continue to the third step to de-
termine whether the broker also made any intentional or negligent
misrepresentations.
3. Latent Defects
In the final scenario, a court should acknowledge that a prudent bro-
ker could not have discovered, for example, that the water main supply-
ing the home was about to rupture. A court should nevertheless review
the broker's inspection report to ascertain whether the broker, for exam-
ple, failed to recognize visible indications of the water main's condition. If
such indications existed, then the defect was hidden-but-discoverable and
the broker should have detected and disclosed it to the buyer. The court's
analysis would not be complete without addressing any alleged inten-
tional or negligent misrepresentations. If the broker fulfilled the profes-
sional standard of care when inspecting the property and made no inten-
tional or negligent misrepresentations, the court should relieve the broker
from liability for the latent defect.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS
A. Which Broker Should Perform the Inspection?
Because the listing broker has the first opportunity to inspect the
89. See Munjal, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 181-82, 485 N.E.2d at 863-64 (broker's disclosure
of a hidden-but-discoverable defect relieved broker from liability).
90. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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premises, the listing broker should have the obligation to perform the ini-
tial inspection, and as promptly as possible. Providing the buyer with an
inspection report as soon as possible will accomplish the fundamental
policy objective of increasing information in the real estate market. After
inspecting the property, the broker should file the inspection report list-
ing all manifest defects, hidden-but-discoverable defects, and any areas
that may require further inquiry. A failure to use professional care in per-
forming the inspection should make the listing broker potentially liable to
the buyer for the breach of the duty to inspect even though the listing
broker may never have contact with the buyer.
The selling broker, on the other hand, should have the obligation to
disclose fully the information in the inspection report to the buyer. Any
failure to disclose should make the selling broker potentially liable for a
misrepresentation. Although the proposed analysis relieves the selling
broker from the duty to inspect the property,91 the analysis imputes
knowledge of the report's contents to the selling broker. The analysis
thereby effectively simplifies the proof required of buyers when bringing a
misrepresentation tort.92
Buyers will benefit from inspection reports only if they receive access
to the report. Therefore, brokers must provide all selling agents easy ac-
cess. Listing brokers could, for example, file the original reports in their
offices and place permanent copies of the report at residences for sale.
B. Performing the Inspection
It is only realistic to anticipate that many brokers will contract with
building inspectors to perform the inspections. These contracts will sup-
port a new business and may provide some of the expert testimony that
the brokers' professional standard requires.9 3 However, courts and legisla-
tures must remain wary that the broker profession does not control the
inspection business. Licensing requirements for inspectors, prohibiting re-
tainer agreements with brokers, and requiring brokers to disclose to buy-
ers the frequency with which the broker hires various inspectors may help
assure inspector independence.
C. Licensing Requirements
Currently, to receive a broker's license an individual need only "have
graduated from an accredited high school or completed an equivalent ed-
91. The broker industry should adjust for this allocation of responsibility by making
listing brokers' share of commissions commensurate with their greater responsibility.
92. A court may nonetheless impose liability on a selling broker for intentional or neg-
ligent misrepresentation if the selling broker actually detected a defect which the listing
broker failed to note in the report.
93. Of course, many buyers and brokers alike already retain building inspectors. Bro-
kers often, however, do not disclose the contents of the inspection reports to buyers, negat-
ing the benefit to buyers.
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ucation" requirement,9 ' "have been actively engaged as a licensed real es-
tate salesman" for two years, 95 and complete a course of study totaling
sixty hours which includes "the subjects of real estate principles, real es-
tate law, real estate finance, and related topics." 96 Although these qualifi-
cations may ensure that brokers fulfill their current duties, the Montana
legislature should reevaluate the efficacy of these qualifications for satis-
fying the expanded duty. Sixty hours of classroom study may not ensure
brokers will be able to detect hidden-but-discoverable defects as their cli-
ents expect.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This comment has proposed to supplant traditional broker tort anal-
ysis with a comprehensive analysis which reflects policy objectives consis-
tent with today's market realities. The expectations of the buyer for more
accurate information conflict with the broker's expectations to limit expo-
sure to liability and reduce costs. The proposed analysis fulfills both par-
ties' expectations by increasing a broker's duties to the buyer while simul-
taneously clarifying and specifying these duties. Given the policy
objectives of fulfilling both broker and buyer expectations, the final
framework of the proposed analysis must include for brokers both a duty
to inspect and a duty to represent information accurately. The Montana
Supreme Court has already recognized the representation duty of this
analysis. A fair and comprehensive legal analysis, however, requires either
legislative or judicial adoption of a clear and specific broker's duty to in-
spect residential real property.
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-302(2)(b) (1987).
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-302(c) (1987). The Board of Realty Regulation may
waive this experience requirement. Id.
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-302(e) (1987).
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